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EDITORIAL COMMENT
PARDON FOR CONTEMPT
The question of whether or not an executive, state or federal,
has authorty to issue pardons for contempt of court, whether
it be civil or criminal contempt, is a moot, but an interesting one.
The courts of the several states are not in accord as to what,
in a given case, constitutes civil or criminal contempt. They
are, however, in almost complete accord in holding that, assum-
ing the question to be determined, neither the governor nor the
presilent has authority to pardon civil c6ntem.pt.
It is generally understood that the distinction between
civil and criminal contempt is that the former consists in failing
to do something ordered to be done by a court in a civil action
for the benefit 6f the opposing party therein, and is therefore not
an offense against the dignity of the court, but against the party
in whose behalf the violated order is made; while the latter is a
direct offense against the dignity of the court. In other words',
contempts of court for which punishment is inflicted for the-
primary purpose of vidicatihg. public authority are denominated
criminal, while those in-,.whit the enforcement of civil rights
and remedies is the ultimate object of the punishment are denom-
inated civil contempts. It was decided in State Ex Rel. Rodd v.
Verage, a 1922 Wisconsin case reported in 187 N. W. 830,. that
whether a contempt was of a civil or criminal nature was a ques-
tion to be determined by the court rather than by the governor.
While punishment inflicted for a contempt growing* out of the
performance of a forbidden act may be criminal, and may be
imposed for punitive purpose merely, it may be imposed for
the purpose of securing to a party litigant his -lawful rights-
this to be determined by the court.
The Conslitution vests in the governor the power to grant
pardons "for all offenses except treason and cases of impeach-
ment." Under this authority it has been held in two states that
the power to pardon for criminal contempt rests with the gov-
ernor. Cases illustrating are: State ex rel. Van Orden v.. Saw-
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inet, a Lousianna case reported in 13 AM. Rep. 115; and Sharp v.
State, a Tennessee case reported in 49 S. W. 752. The Supreme
Court of the United States also took this view in Ex parte
Grossman, a 1925 case reported in 267 U. S. 87. On the other
hand, Indiana and Texas, as shown by the respective cases of
Taylor v. Goodrich reported in 40 S. W. 415 and the recent case
of State v. Shumacher r.eported in 157 N. E. 769, have taken the
position that contempt of court is not an "offense" within the
meaning of the term as used in the Constitution, and that
contempt-even criminal contempt-is not an offense subject
to executive pardon. It is not an ordinary offense because. one
charged with it is not entitled to an trial by jury-a constitutional
right secured to the ordinary offender. The Constitution pro-
vides that for all offenses against the United States one is en-
titled to a trial by jury. Since it is a proposition too well estab-
lished to be the subject of dispute that one charged with con-
tempt is not entitled to a trial by jury, it follows, logically,
that criminal contempt of court is not an "offense" within the
the meaning of the Constitution. These latter courts, it occurs
to the writer, have taken the more logical and enlightened view.
It is a function of the judiciary to declare and enforce private
and public rights. The power to punish for contempt is an in-
herent power to enforce its orders and decrees and, in general, to
enable it to perorm the functions for which it was created. The
founders of our government intended that the three branches of
outi government-legislative, executive, and judicial-shlould
be distinct and independent; that in the exercise of their respec-
tive Constitutional functions each should be free from inter-
ference on the part of every other. The judiciary, more than any
other department of the government, should be immune from
outside influence and interference. If the governor is permitted
to pardon those guilty of contdmpt of court, the judic ial branch
of the government is, to that extent, made dependent on the
executive branch. It is obvious that the judicial branch of the
government cannot effectively perform its functions in the ad-
ministration of justice unless its authority and dignity are ac-
corded the highest respect, and its dignity and authority are im-
periled when the executive branch possesses a veto over the ex-
ercise of its power to punish for contempt and disobedience.
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Chief justice Marshall once defined a pardon as "an act of
grace, proceeding from the power intrusted with the execution
of the laws, which exempts the individual on whom it is be-
stowed, from the punishment the law inflicts for the crime he
has committed." As the governor is charged with the duty of
seeing that the laws are faithfully executed it is in strict ac-
cordance with the theory of the power of pardon that he should
have power to pardon offenders against the laws which it is his
duty to execute. But it does not by any means follow that he
should have the power of pardoning offenses with respec.t to
which he has no duty or concern; and he has no duty or con-
cern with respect to the offense of contempt of court.
F. T. R.
